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Abstract One of the stylized facts underlying prospect theory is a fourfold pattern
of risk preferences. People have been shown to be risk seeking for small probabil-
ity gains and large probability losses, while being risk averse for large probability
gains and small probability losses. Another fourfold pattern of risk preferences over
outcomes, postulated by Harry Markowitz in 1952, has received much less attention
and is currently not integrated into prospect theory. In two experiments, we show that
risk preferences may change over outcomes. While we find people to be risk seek-
ing for small outcomes, this turns to risk neutrality and later risk aversion as stakes
increase. We then show how a one-parameter logarithmic utility function fits such
stake effects significantly better under prospect theory than the power or exponential
functions mostly used when fitting prospect theory models. We further investigate the
extent to which the use of ill-suited functional forms to represent utility may result
in violations of prospect theory, and whether such violations disappear when using
logarithmic utility.
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1 Introduction
Almost any important real world decision involves considerable levels of risk. It thus
comes as no surprise that attitudes toward such risks and how to model them have
received considerable attention in economics. After the axiomatization by von Neu-
mann and Morgenstern (1944) of Daniel Bernoulli’s 1738 expected utility theory
(reprinted in Bernoulli 1954), it soon became clear that a setup richer than a func-
tion with one subjective dimension defined over lifetime wealth would be needed to
model real world behavior such as the coexistence of insurance uptake and lottery
play (for an early discussion of these issues, see Vickrey 1945). Markowitz (1952)
provided such a framework by allowing preferences to differ between gains and
losses relative to a reference point given by current wealth. Psychologists Preston
and Baratta (1948) proposed a different solution, involving the subjective transfor-
mation of probabilities instead of outcomes—a solution that they considered to be
psychologically more realistic (Lopes 1987).
The two approaches of subjectively transforming changes in wealth into utilities
and subjectively transforming probabilities into decision weights were finally com-
bined in prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Tversky and Kahneman
1992). Prospect theory is recognized by most scholars to be the leading descriptive
theory of decision making under risk today (Barberis 2013; Starmer 2000; Wakker
2010). Nevertheless, its descriptive accuracy continues to be debated. Scholten and
Read (2014) recently pointed out how prospect theory has generally neglected the
type of changes in risk attitudes taking place purely over outcomes while keep-
ing probabilities constant, as originally proposed by Markowitz (1952). Fehr-Duda
et al. (2010) uncovered issues in the separability principle underlying prospect the-
ory—a principle according to which changes in preferences over outcomes ought to
be reflected purely in utility, while changes in preferences over probabilities ought to
be reflected in probability weighting.
We set out to revisit the issue of whether a double-fourfold pattern of risk pref-
erences—changes from risk seeking to risk aversion over the probability spectrum,
and changes from risk seeking to risk aversion over the outcome spectrum—can be
accommodated within a prospect theory framework without increasing the number
of parameters. We thereby expand on the insights provided by Scholten and Read
(2014) by generalizing the results to probabilities larger than their p ≤ 0.1 and
by discussing the economic and psychological underpinnings of the candidate util-
ity functions. This further allows us to revisit the separability violations pinpointed
by Fehr-Duda et al. (2010), and thus to examine the descriptive validity of prospect
theory in our setup. Indeed, while a good fit of functional forms is necessary for sep-
arability to hold, it is not sufficient, so that separability does not necessarily follow
from a good fit of functional forms to the data.
We conduct two experiments to investigate these issues. The first one is an incen-
tivized experiment over gains. While this has the advantage of rendering the decision
real for subjects, it suffers the drawback of restricting our stake range and to make
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the investigation of losses problematic. We thus supplement the insights gained from
experiment 1 with a second, hypothetical experiment. This allows us to examine the
whole fourfoldpatternof riskpreferencesoveroutcomes, including gains as well as losses.
Furthermore, it serves the purpose of testing the stability of the results obtained in experiment
1 to truly large stakes, beyond what we could provide under real incentives.
In both experiments, we find relative risk aversion to increase in stakes at all prob-
ability levels, with qualitative reversals from risk seeking to risk aversion as stakes
increase for some probability levels, as described in Markowitz’s original thought
experiment. We also replicate qualitatively similar probability distortions across dif-
ferent stake levels, as originally found by Preston and Baratta (1948). We then
proceed to fit functional forms to our data. We find the frequently used power utility
function to provide the worst fit to our data—perhaps unsurprisingly, given how that
function assumes constant relative risk aversion, while we find relative risk aversion
to increase in stakes for gains. The logarithmic utility function proposed by Scholten
and Read (2010) for intertemporal decisions, and applied to risk by Scholten and
Read (2014), is found to fit our data best. The reason for this may lie in the psycho-
logical insight that the subjective sensation derived from a physical stimulus often
tends to be proportional to the logarithm of the physical stimulus itself (known as the
Weber-Fechner law). From an economic point of view the logarithmic utility func-
tion, which can be traced all the way back to Bernoulli’s 1738 essay, incorporates
both increasing relative risk aversion and decreasing absolute risk aversion, which
constitute the most common empirical finding (Wakker 2010).
Our results in terms of separability violations are more nuanced. Examining risk
preferences over low and high stakes, Fehr-Duda et al. (2010) found stake effects and
the resulting increase in relative risk aversion to be reflected in probability weighting
rather than in utility curvature (see also Hogarth and Einhorn 1990). This violates
the separability precept of prospect theory, whereby changes in outcomes ought to be
purely reflected in utility curvature. We replicate their finding of high stakes shifting
probability weighting downwards using a setup similar to the original one. We then
show that, when combining our two-parameter weighting function with a logarithmic
utility function, these stake effects on probability weighting disappear in experiment
1. This shows that one issue underlying separability violations can be found in the
traditional neglect of qualitative changes in risk attitudes over outcomes, and from
the inability of traditional power and exponential utility functions to account for such
patterns. In experiment 2, however, the use of a logarithmic utility function does not
eliminate the issue completely. Indeed, we still observe a separability violation for
some stake levels, an issue that seems to be driven by different reactions to changes
in outcomes across probabilities.
2 Theory and econometrics
2.1 Theoretical setup
We start from a description of our theoretical setup. We work with experimentally
elicited indifferences cei ∼ (xi, pi; yi) throughout, whereby cei is the certainty
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equivalent of a prospect giving a pi chance to obtain xi , and a complementary chance
of 1−pi at |yi | < |xi |. We are interested in particular in three models: i) Markowitz-
expected utility (MEU); ii) Dual-expected utility (DEU); and iii) prospect theory
(PT).
We start from MEU. For our experimental setup, the function takes the following
form:
u(cei) = piu(xi) + (1 − pi)u(yi). (1)
Other than under expected utility theory, where utility is formulated over total wealth,
u under MEU captures a reference-dependent utility function over changes in wealth.
This form of utility was motivated by the observation that people may take out insur-
ance and play the lottery, and they often do so at the same time and regardless of
their wealth levels. This led Markowitz to conclude that utility must be first con-
vex and then concave over positive changes of wealth, while utility would be first
concave and then convex for losses. To illustrate the plausibility of these patterns,
Markowitz conducted the following thought experiment. Given the choice between
a 10% probability of obtaining $10 and $1 for sure, most people would likely take
the gamble. Scaling up all outcomes, most people might still prefer a 10% chance
of obtaining $100 over $10 for sure. Continuing this exercise, however, one would
invariably reach a point where almost everyone would prefer the sure amount—few
people indeed would turn down $1 million for sure for a 10% chance at $10 million.
Similarly, for losses most people may pay $1 rather than taking a 10% chance of los-
ing $10, but very few would (or indeed could) pay if the amounts were scaled up by
one million. Furthermore, Markowitz suggested that utility would also be steeper for
losses than for gains, reflecting a general aversion to losses of wealth.
An alternative way of representing preferences was proposed a few years previ-
ously by psychologists Preston and Baratta (1948). Observing that risk preferences
varied systematically over the probability scale for several different stake levels,
they proposed to subjectively transform probabilities into decision weights instead
of transforming outcomes into utilities. Mathematically, this constitutes the dual
function of expected utility. This function has been axiomatized for the dual of
rank-dependent utility by Yaari (1987). Schmidt and Zank (2007) provide an axiom-
atization for the dual of the reference-dependent MEU. This can be represented as
follows:
cei = πs(p)xi + [1 − πs(p)]yi, (2)
where π represents a subjective decision weight associated to a given probability p
that is not necessarily equal to the probability p itself, and the subscript s indicates
the sign of the outcomes, allowing for different decision weights for gains and for
losses. Risk preferences in this setup are thus completely represented by the decision
weight.
Finally the combination of the primal (MEU) and the dual (DEU) results in PT,
which incorporates nonlinear transforms of both outcomes and probabilities and takes
the following form:
v(cei) = πs(p)v(xi) + [1 − πs(p)]v(yi), (3)
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where v(.) represents a utility or value function with a fixed point at 0, which is
not necessarily the same function as indicated by u above under the linear probabil-
ity assumption (Bleichrodt et al. 2007; Schmidt and Zank 2008). Prospect theory’s
separability precept then implies that changes in outcomes xi and yi ought to affect
only the utility function v, with the decision weights πs invariant to such changes.
Whether changing risk preferences over outcomes for constant probabilities can be
accommodated by the utility function v will now depend inter alia on the functional
forms adopted to represent utility—the issue which we discuss next.
2.2 The utility function and probability-outcome separability
We want to investigate the two connected issues of 1) whether we can fit the double
fourfold pattern over outcomes and over probabilities in a prospect theory framework;
and 2) whether we can do so without violating probability-outcome separability.
Given this focus, the choice of functional form has important substantive implica-
tions. This is particularly true for the form of the utility function, since it is the
fourfold pattern over outcomes which has not received much attention in the prospect
theory literature.
Our task will now be to find a utility function that can accommodate qualitative
changes in risk preferences over the outcome space while holding probabilities con-
stant, assuming decision weights π(p) that are invariant over such changes (i.e., they
only depend on p, and not on x or y). To do this, it is useful to represent the decision
weight in its fully general form according to Eq. 3:
π(p) = u(cei) − u(yi)
u(xi) − u(yi) , (4)
where we dropped the subscript s for notational convenience. Given that decision
weights in this formulation are invariant to outcomes by definition, our task will now
be to find a utility function v that allows us to accommodate patterns of changing risk
preferences.
To organize our ideas, let us start from DEU, where u(x) = x. Treating out-
comes linearly, that model can clearly not explain patterns of relative risk aversion
that change over outcomes. Let us assume without loss of generality that y = 0, thus
giving us cei = π(p)xi . For example, if π(0.5) = 0.4 and xi = 10, we will observe
cei = 4. If we now increase the outcome such that xi = 100, assuming separability
to hold we will observe cei = 40, i.e. the increase in the certainty equivalent must be
directly proportionate to the increase in the outcome. Clearly, such directly propor-
tionate changes are at odds with Markowitz’s observation that preferences can change
from risk seeking to risk averse (and vice versa for losses) while holding probabilities
constant.
Looking at nonlinear utility transformations we can start from arguably the most
popular functional form, power utility. This function owes its popularity to the ease
with which it can be manipulated and fit to data, and the good fit it has been found
to provide in many cases (Wakker 2008). This functional form was for instance
used by Tversky and Kahneman (1992) to estimate prospect theory parameters, and
also constitutes the main functional form employed by Fehr-Duda et al. (2010) in
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their investigation of separability (although they also tested the stability of the phe-
nomenon to other functional forms, an issue to which we will return below). The
function takes the following normalized form
v(x) =
{
x1−ρ
1−ρ if x ≥ 0
−λ(−x)1−θ1−θ , if x < 0
(5)
with ρ > 0 indicating concave utility for gains, and θ > 0 indicating convex utility
for losses (decreasing sensitivity), while λ > 1 indicates loss aversion. For values
of ρ = 1, the function converges to log(x) (and if θ = 1 to −λlog(−x) for losses)
(Wakker 2008). This function is also known as the constant relative risk aversion
(CRRA) function, since its coefficient of relative risk aversion for gains is simply
equal to ρ, and hence independent of the function’s argument x.1 To determine
whether this utility function can accommodate changing patterns of risk aversion
over outcomes, take two stake levels, designated by s for small stakes, and  for
large stakes. Let us assume that large stakes are given by k > 1 times small stakes.
Using Eq. 4 and substituting the utility from Eq. 5, we obtain that for power utility
|ce| = |kces |, i.e. the certainty equivalent for high stakes must be directly propor-
tional to the certainty equivalent for low stakes. This, however, directly contradicts
Markowitz’s thought experiment, which predicts |ce| < |kces |. We thus conclude
that power utility is not suited to capturing changing patterns of risk preferences over
outcomes.
In order to accommodate the type of pattern that emerges from Markowitz’s
thought experiment, we thus need to look at utility functions able to accommo-
date increasing relative risk aversion (IRRA). Importantly for our purpose, such
functions can accommodate patterns that change from risk seeking to risk aver-
sion, implying that for small stakes it can accommodate risk seeking for gains by
π(p)v(x) > v(px), while this pattern may reverse as all outcomes are increased so
that π(p)v(kx) < v(pkx) for some k > 1 (and vice versa for losses).2 This cap-
tures the intuition that as outcome magnitude increases, the utility of the outcomes
increases less than proportionally.
A prime candidate exhibiting this property is the exponential function. The nor-
malized version takes the following form for values of μ, ν > 0, indicating
decreasing sensitivity:
v(x) =
{
1
μ
(1 − exp(−μx)) if x ≥ 0
−λ
ν
(1 − exp(νx)) if x < 0. (6)
For μ = 0 and ν = 0 the functional form is linear and becomes v(x) = x and
v(x) = −λ(−x) for gains and losses respectively. This functional form was used for
1Technically, the reference to risk aversion is wrong in the context of PT, since risk aversion under prospect
theory is determined jointly by utility curvature and decision weights, so that a reference to concavity
would be more appropriate (Wakker 2010). We nevertheless continue using this terminology here for
continuity with discussion in the expected utility literature.
2Coming from the literature on intertemporal decision making, Scholten and Read (2014) discuss this
requirement in terms of decreasing elasticity. Elasticity is thereby defined as v =
d
dx (log[v(x)])
d
dx (log(x))
.
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instance by Ko¨bberling andWakker (2005) to fit data frommixed gain-loss prospects,
and by Choi et al. (2007) to fit data from portfolio selection tasks implemented
in a laboratory experiment. One potential drawback of the exponential function is
that it is bounded, with a bound from above of 1/μ for gains, and a bound from
below of −λ/ν for losses. If the function approaches this bound too rapidly, then it
may increase quickly for relatively small changes from the reference point, while
changes above a certain amount may no longer increase utility at all (Scholten and
Read 2014). A further limitation of the function when fitting data over large out-
come ranges may be that it exhibits constant absolute risk aversion (CARA). Most
empirical results, on the other hand, indicate that decreasing absolute risk aversion
(DARA) is a more accurate description of behavior (see Wakker 2010, and references
therein).
An alternative is then the normalized logarithmic utility function (Rachlin 1992;
Scholten and Read 2010, 2014). Under the usual decreasing sensitivity assumption
the function takes the following form:
v(x) =
{
1
γ
log (1 + γ x) if x ≥ 0
−λ
δ
log (1 + δ(−x)) if x < 0. (7)
where γ > 0 indicates concavity for gains, and δ > 0 convexity for losses,
while for γ = 0 and δ = 0 the function becomes again v(x) = x and v(x) =
−λx for gains and losses respectively. This function has the desirable empirical
property of combining IRRA with DARA. It is also unbounded, meaning subse-
quent increases in outcomes will always further increase utility, no matter to what
amount they are added. It furthermore captures an insight on human perception
of physical stimuli such as brightness and loudness, known as the Weber-Fechner
law. The Weber-Fechner law states that the subjective sensation deriving from a
physical stimulus is proportional to the logarithm of the stimulus intensity itself
(see Kontek 2011, for a discussion). Whether this insight generalizes to the per-
ception of monetary outcomes under risk is a question we endeavor to answer
below.
Some papers in the literature have also used two-parameter utility functions. The
most popular among these is arguably the so-called expo-power function developed
by Saha (1993). It can be constructed based on Eq. 6, by simply adding a power to
the exponential formulation:
v(x) =
{
1
μ
(1 − exp(−μxρ)) if x ≥ 0
−λ
ν
(
1 − exp(−ν(−x)θ )) if x < 0. (8)
The power parameter ρ can be interpreted as an indicator of absolute risk aversion
for gains, with ρ < 1 indicating decreasing absolute risk aversion, ρ = 1 constant
absolute risk aversion, and ρ > 1 increasing absolute risk aversion. The parameter
μ indicates levels of relative risk aversion, with μ < 0 indicating decreasing rela-
tive risk aversion, and μ > 0 increasing relative risk aversion. The interpretation for
losses is similar. We are interested in the use of this function mainly under MEU,
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where it may allow us to capture changing patterns of risk attitudes over outcomes
in the absence of probability weighting. Under PT this is not strictly needed, as dis-
cussed above, so that we will restrict ourselves to one-parameter functions in the
interest of parsimony.
Before moving on, we need to devote some more attention to the issue of separa-
bility. The conditions on the utility function set out above constitute necessary rather
than sufficient conditions for separability. Intuitively, we will need two more condi-
tions for separability to hold. Imagine we would measure point estimates of utilities
and decision weights rather than fitting functions to the data. Since we will always
need nonzero lower outcomes to uniquely identify decision weights separately from
utilities, a minimal condition will be that the utility estimated for a given outcome
x will be the same whether this is the higher outcome in a small-stake prospect, or
the smaller outcome in a large-stake prospect. A further complication arises when
we proceed to estimating a whole probability weighting function, w, that traces deci-
sion weights over the whole probability spectrum. Indeed, we now need the changes
in utility following changes in outcomes to be consistent across different probability
levels. Both conditions are far from trivial, so that we may still observe separability
violations even if we were to find a utility function that fits the patterns of chang-
ing risk aversion over outcomes quite closely. Accommodating qualitative changes in
risk preferences and satisfying separability are thus two quite separate and different
issues.
Finally, we need to select functional forms for the probability weighting func-
tion. We use the two-parameter probability weighting function developed by Prelec
(1998):
w(p) = exp(−βs(−ln(p))αs ) (9)
where β governs mostly the elevation of the weighting function, with higher val-
ues indicating a less elevated function. This parameter can thus be interpreted
as capturing probabilistic pessimism for gains, and probabilistic optimism for
losses. The parameter α governs the slope of the probability weighting function
and hence probabilistic sensitivity. A value of α = 1 indicates linearity of the
weighting function, and α < 1 represents the typical case of probabilistic insen-
sitivity (Abdellaoui 2000; Tversky and Fox 1995; Wu and Gonzalez 1996). All
results presented below remain qualitatively unchanged if we use an alternative
two-parameter function developed by Goldstein and Einhorn (1987) instead. How-
ever, the two-parameter function by Prelec provides a significantly better fit to our
data.3 One-parameter functions, such as the one proposed by Tversky and Kah-
neman (1992), are generally not suitable in our context, since we want to fit the
variation over probabilities in the most flexible way possible, and allow for shifts
of the probability weighting function as outcomes vary to provide a strong test of
separability.
3This holds true strictly for experiment 1, while we find no difference in goodness of fit between the two
functions in experiment 2.
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2.3 Econometric approach
The model just presented is deterministic in nature. To accommodate the possibility
that people make mistakes, we now develop an explicit stochastic structure. Given
that we aim to model preference relations cei ∼ (xi, pi; yi), we can represent the
certainty equivalent predicted by our model, cˆei , as follows:
ˆcei = v−1[ws(pi)v(xi) + (1 − ws(pi)) v(yi)]. (10)
The actual certainty equivalent we observe will now be equal to the certainty equiv-
alent calculated from our model plus some error term, or cei = cˆei + i . We assume
this error to be normally distributed with mean zero, i ∼ N(0, σ 2i ) (see Train 2009).
We can now express the probability density function ψ(.) for a given subject n and
prospect i as follows
ψin(θ, σi) = φ
(
cˆei − cei
σi
)
(11)
where φ is the standard normal density function, and θ indicates the vector of param-
eters to be estimated. The subscript i indicates that we allow the error term to depend
on the specific prospect, or rather, on the difference between the high and low out-
come in the prospect, such that σi = σ |xi − yi |.4 This allows the error term to differ
for choice lists of different lengths, since the sure amount always varies in equal steps
between xi and yi in our experimental design.
These parameters can now be estimated by standard maximum likelihood proce-
dures. To obtain the overall likelihood function, we now need to take the product of
the density functions above across prospects for each subject:
Ln(θ) =
∏
i
ψin(θ, σis) (12)
where θ is the vector of parameters to be estimated such as to maximize the likelihood
function, and the subscript n indicates the subject-specific likelihood. The subscript s
to the error term further indicates that we allow for heteroscedasticity across decision
domains (i.e. differences in errors for gains and losses). Taking logs and summing
over decision makers n we obtain
LL(θ) =
N∑
n=1
ln [Ln(θ)] (13)
We estimate this log-likelihood function in Stata 13 using the Broyden-Fletcher-
Goldfarb-Shanno optimization algorithm. Errors are always clustered at the subject
level.
4Wilcox (2011) pointed out a potential problem when applying such a model in a discrete choice setup,
whereby the probability of choosing the riskier prospect may be increasing in risk aversion in some cases.
This problem does not apply in our setting. Also, Apesteguia and Ballester (2014) have shown that this
problem does not occur even in discrete choice models when a derived certainty equivalent is compared to
a sure amount, as in our setup.
10 J Risk Uncertain (2017) 55:1–28
3 Experiment 1: Incentivized gains
3.1 Experimental setup
Participants and setting The experiment was run as a classroom experiment at the
beginning of a class in Advanced Microeconomics at the University of Reading, UK,
in the fall term 2015. A total of 47 students showed up on the first day of class
and participated in the experiment. We eliminate two students because they exhib-
ited multiple switching behavior in some choice lists. Students had been taught the
basics of expected utility theory in Intermediate Microeconomics the previous year.
This discussion followed a standard exposition, and stressed neither initial wealth
integration, nor were any violations of EUT discussed in class.
Students were told that their answers were to be kept anonymous and would not
be traced back to them. Students were also told that there were no right and wrong
answers, and that they only needed to record their preferences. They were also told
that the lecturer would be using average responses (but never individual ones) as
examples of behavior during class, and that they may find it interesting to look at
their preferences as the course progressed.
Stimuli We use two-outcome prospects throughout. The stimuli used in the exper-
iment are reported in Table 1. We included three different probability levels, 0.1,
0.5, and 0.9. The stakes ranged from £10 to £200. High stakes were needed in order
to meaningfully test the Markowitz patterns over outcomes with constant probabil-
ity. Finally, non-zero lower outcomes were needed to separate utility curvature from
probability weighting in parametric estimates of prospect theory. The stimuli were
balanced in the sense that all stake levels were included for all probabilities. The
order of the tasks was counterbalanced.
Incentives Participants were told that two individuals in the class would be ran-
domly selected to play one of their choices for real money. The selection took place
based on random numbers attached to the questionnaires, in order to guarantee the
anonymity of the selected students. Although paying for one randomly selected task
may raise theoretical concerns under non-expected utility models, it is the standard
procedure in this type of experiment. Empirically, tests of this issue did not find a
difference between deterministic incentives and incentivization based on randomly
chosen rounds (Bardsley et al. 2010; Cubitt et al. 1998). They constitute the only
solution if one wants to obtain rich measurements of preferences for each subject.
Table 1 Experimental stimuli
Probability Low stakes High stakes Prospect theory
0.1: (10,0) (20,0) (60,0) (100,0) (200, 0) (200,20) (200,60)
0.5: (10,0) (20,0) (60,0) (100,0) (200, 0) (200,20) (200,60)
0.9: (10,0) (20,0) (60,0) (100,0) (200, 0) (200,20) (200,60)
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Randomization between subjects is also a standard procedure followed in the litera-
ture when high stakes are offered (Abdellaoui et al. 2008; Harrison et al. 2007). Some
papers explicitly tested whether paying only some randomly selected subjects made a
difference, and found none (Armantier 2006; Bolle 1990; Harrison et al. 2007). Full
instructions are included in the online appendix.
3.2 Nonparametric analysis of results
We start by showing some descriptive results. To this end we obtain a nomalized risk
premium as follows. First, we normalize the certainty equivalent to cei−yi
xi−yi . This is
a measure of risk tolerance, and has the advantage that it is comparable across out-
come levels. Conveniently, it corresponds to a decision weight, π(pi), under DEU. To
obtain also comparability across probabilities, we further subtract this risk tolerance
measure from the probability of winning in a given prospect, to obtain the relative
risk premium ri = pi − cei−yixi−yi . This can be interpreted as a measure of risk aversion.
It is a measure of whether the decision weight for a given prospect under linear utility
is a) lower than the probability itself (ri > 0, risk aversion); b) higher than the prob-
ability (ri < 0, risk seeking); or c) equal to the probability (ri = 0, risk neutrality).
The risk premia are now perfectly comparable across both stakes and probabilities.
Figure 1 shows the mean normalized risk premia for all prospects with zero lower
outcomes. Two general patterns stand out. First, within each stake level risk aversion
clearly increases in probabilities. For the smallest probability of p = 0.1, we find sig-
nificant risk seeking for all stake levels. For p = 0.9, we find significant risk aversion
across all stake levels. Risk preferences for p = 0.5 are always intermediate between
those of the more extreme probabilities. Second, across stakes the mean risk premia
Fig. 1 Mean normalized CEs with 95% confidence intervals
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move up for every probability, indicating relative risk aversion increasing in stakes.
For the intermediate probability of p = 0.5 we indeed find qualitatively different
patterns across stakes as predicted byMarkowitz—risk seeking for the smallest prize,
and risk aversion for the largest prize, with risk neutrality for intermediate stakes.5
The levels of risk aversion we find may seem low. The trend of relatively low levels
of risk aversion is, however, consistent with the results from the international com-
parison of risk preferences reported by L’Haridon and Vieider (2016), where Britain
constituted an outlier among rich countries.6
We can represent these preferences non-parametrically by assuming either MEU
or DEU. Since utility is only unique up to an affine transformation, we can normalize
the lowest and highest outcomes in a series of prospects arbitrarily. By choosing
u(x) ≡ 1 and u(y) ≡ 0, we can plot the non-parametric functions that result from
probability variations while keeping the outcomes in the prospect constant. While
not corresponding to Markowitz’s original thought experiment (where probabilities
were held constant and outcomes varied), this representation is perfectly legitimate
in terms of Markowitz’s theory. Figure 2a shows such a plot of utility for two stake
levels (plots for other stake levels are similar), with monetary amounts on the abscissa
and utility of money on the ordinate. In both cases, we observe the expected pattern
of risk seeking for relatively small expected outcomes, and risk aversion for larger
expected outcomes.
Problems become apparent when comparing the stake ranges over which we
observe these patterns. For the low stake prospect offering a chance at £20 or else 0,
we observe risk seeking up to an expected outcome of £10.8, and risk aversion from
£16.8, with preferences changing somewhere in between. If one looks at the curve
drawn using the £200 stake level, however, risk seeking ranges to well above £43.
This is a clear contradiction with the risk aversion starting at £16.8 in the lower stake
prospect. What this goes to show is simply that Markowitz-expected utility is not
good at handling variation in probabilities.7 Subjectively transforming probabilities
likely constitutes a better way of capturing this type of variation (Preston and Baratta
1948; Yaari 1987).
Probability transformations combined with linear utility are shown in Fig. 2b
for the same two stake levels, with probabilities shown on the abscissa and deci-
sion weights on the ordinate. These nonparametric representations are obtained for
5Markowitz used a small probability of p = 0.1 in his thought experiment. The fact that we find uniform
risk seeking behavior for this probability level reflects the issue that our real stakes are much smaller than
those used by Markowitz in his hypothetical thought experiment. Experiment 2 below will address this
difference.
6It is still somewhat unclear why that may be the case. L’Haridon and Vieider (2016) speculated that
this may be due to the large proportion of students of foreign origin participating in the study. However,
Bouchouicha and Vieider (2017) also found Britain to be relatively more risk tolerant than other countries
with similar GDP per capita based on survey questions answered by representative samples.
7One could imagine that the curve may be initially convex, then concave, and then convex again. Originally
proposed as a solution for the contradictions found in original expected utility theory by Friedman and
Savage (1948), such a fix quickly runs into contradictions itself. We can show this in our own data recurring
to other stake levels. For instance, the prospect offering £60 with a 0.9 probability shows clear risk aversion
at £47—very close to the risk seeking for £43 found for £200 obtaining with a probability of 0.1.
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Fig. 2 Modeling of risk preferences in prospects (200, pi ) and (20, pi)
prospects with 0 lower outcomes from Eq. 4 under the linear utility assumption under-
lying DEU. For both stake levels, risk seeking for small probabilities is now reflected
in a subjective weight that is larger than the objective probability, π(0.1) > 0.1.
This is the probability attributed to winning the prize, and can thus be interpreted
as a measure of optimism. For the largest probability, this pattern is inverted, i.e.
π(0.9) < 0.9. Problems surface when looking at differences in stakes. Passing from
£20 to £200, the function shifts systematically downwards. However, this cannot be
captured in any of the subjective transformations, since the probabilities remain iden-
tical. In other words, we observe dual violations for the dual theory—it performs very
badly at handling outcome variations.
3.3 Fitting prospect theory parameters
The issues just shown constituted the rationale for the development of prospect the-
ory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Tversky and Kahneman 1992), which combines
the non-linear reference-dependent outcome transformations proposed by Markowitz
with non-linear transformations of probabilities into decision weights. This, however,
raises the issue of whether differences across stake levels will purely be reflected in
utility curvature, and differences across probabilities purely in probability weight-
ing. Using state-of-the-art structural estimation techniques, Fehr-Duda et al. (2010)
indeed found increases in stake sizes to register in probability weighting rather than
in utility curvature. Prospect theory has also typically not incorporated the qualitative
changes from risk seeking to risk aversion over outcomes emphasized by Markowitz
(Scholten and Read 2014), which as we have seen above cannot be handled by the
popular power utility function. In this section, we will start fitting functional forms
to the data.
Table 2 shows parameter estimates of our main models. Testing PT with exponen-
tial utility against PT with power utility, we find the former to perform significantly
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Table 2 Parameter estimations for different models
Prospect theory Markowitz-EU Dual-EU
expo power log
μ 0.005 0.001
[0.004,0.007] [0.000,0.001]
ρ 1.106 1.470
[0.832,1.380] [1.253,1.687]
γ 0.016
[0.004,0.027]
α 0.634 0.593 0.635 0.594
[0.594,0.673] [0.525,0.660] [0.564,0.707] [0.559,0.629]
β 0.720 0.935 0.664 0.857
[0.676,0.765] [0.735,1.135] [0.570,0.757] [0.827,0.887]
σ 0.158 0.162 0.157 0.181 0.162
[0.151,0.165] [0.137,0.188] [0.131,0.183] [0.152,0.209] [0.155,0.170]
Subjects 45 45 45 45 45
ll -3497.51 -3520.28 -3492.72 -3620.67 -3521.14
95% Confidence intervals in parentheses
better (p < 0.001, Clarke test).8 Notice also how the confidence intervals estimated
around the point estimates are much narrower with exponential utility than under
power utility, which may indicate collinearity between utility curvature and the ele-
vation of the probability weighting function using the power function. Indeed, PT
with power utility performs no better than DEU in our setting—notwithstanding the
clear violations of DEU we showed in the nonparametric analysis above (p = 0.190,
likelihood-ratio test). Directly comparing MEU and DEU yields a clear verdict in
favor of the Dual (p < 0.001, Clarke test). This reflects the fact that for the stake
sizes here employed, variation of risk preferences across the probabilistic dimension
is much more important than variation across stakes (Fehr-Duda and Epper 2012).
This could change when stakes get truly important—an issue to which we will return
in experiment 2.
Scholten and Read (2014) found a PT model with logarithmic utility to fit their
data involving probabilities smaller than or equal to 0.1 significantly better than
power utility. We confirm this result (p < 0.001, Clarke test), and extend it to
exponential utility (p < 0.001, Clarke test). This result obtains because for small
stakes the probability weights overpower the utility function, thus accommodating
8Test results are qualitatively unaffected if we use a parametric Vuong test instead. We will henceforth
report Clarke tests whenever the models are non-nested, while we will use likelihood ratio tests for nested
models.
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risk seeking pattern. For larger stakes, on the other hand, utility trumps weighting.
Since this pattern in risk preferences holds especially for moderate probabilities of
p = 0.5, a two-parameter probability weighting function is essential to accommo-
date the behavioral patterns observed in our data. Notice also that a similar elevation
of the probability weighting function is observed in combination with the exponen-
tial utility function. This reflects the generally high levels of risk taking we find in
our data—we will further discuss the implications of this below.9
We have modeled the gain part of the double fourfold pattern of risk preferences
across stakes and probabilities using a prospect theory formulation combining a log-
arithmic utility function with a two-parameter probability weighting function, which
we indeed found to provide the best fit for the data. Nevertheless, stake effects have
been shown to result in a more fundamental challenge to this type of modeling.
Fehr-Duda et al. (2010) used low and high stake prospects of a type similar to the
ones employed here to estimate a prospect theory model. Letting the parameters of
the model depend linearly on a high stakes treatment dummy, they found that stake
effects were reflected in the probability weighting function rather than in the utility
function. Their results thus cast doubt on the separability of outcome and probabil-
ity transformations underlying models such as prospect theory and rank-dependent
utility.
We can now attempt to replicate this pattern in our data. Since we only have
nonzero lower outcomes for the highest stakes in our data, however, we cannot fol-
low their approach of making both the utility parameter and the weighting parameters
dependent on stake levels. Instead we always estimate the utility function over the
whole outcome range, without making it a function of the stake level. Probability
weighting, on the other hand, can be made a function of stakes, since we have vari-
ation over probabilities at all stake levels. We hereby follow the same strategy of
Fehr-Duda et al. (2010), by letting the two parameters of the weighting function (as
well as the noise parameter) be a linear function of a stake-level dummy. If utility
fully picks up our outcome variation, no stake effects on probability weighting should
be found. If, on the other hand, separability is violated, we would expect to find stake
effects in our data.
We estimate this model using power utility like Fehr-Duda et al. (2010), expo-
nential utility, and with our best-fitting logarithmic utility function from above. As
an independent variable, we use a dummy indicator for high stakes, which takes the
value 1 if the stakes are £60 or higher (the results are not sensitive to where the line
between high and low stakes is drawn exactly; they are also stable to inserting the
monetary outcomes directly as an independent variable). Table 3 shows the regres-
sions. The upper panel shows the results using power utility. We find a strong and
highly significant effect of stakes on the probability weighting function. The effect
goes in the direction of pessimism increasing in stakes. This effect replicates the
effect found by Fehr-Duda et al. (2010). The strength can be seen from Fig. 3a—the
9It is also possible to estimate our PT model in combination with the expo-power utility function, although
this leads to a proliferation of parameters. We find in our data that—while such a model significantly
outperforms the power and exponential utility formulations—it still performs less well than log utility
(p < 0.001; Clarke test).
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Table 3 Stake effects on probability weighting, power utility
Power utility
Parameters: ρ α β σ
constant 0.095 0.613*** 0.639*** 0.167***
(0.091) (0.032) (0.054) (0.015)
high stakes -0.022 0.214*** -0.013
(0.029) (0.050) (0.012)
Expo utility
Parameters: μ α β σ
constant 0.003** 0.619*** 0.694*** 0.167***
(0.001) (0.033) (0.051) (0.015)
high stakes 0.000 0.125*** -0.013
(0.033) (0.044) (0.012)
Log utility
Parameters: γ α β σ
constant 0.011 0.622*** 0.669*** 0.167***
(0.008) (0.035) (0.047) (0.015)
high stakes 0.013 0.035 -0.013
(0.032) (0.079) (0.012)
∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01;
high stakes weighting function is shifted downwards relative to the low stakes one,
and crosses the 45 degree line at a much lower point. Indeed, we do no longer find
probabilistic optimism (or risk seeking, given the linearity of utility) for p = 0.5
under high stakes. We do not find a significant difference in probabilistic sensitivity.
Similar effects obtain with an exponential utility function, shown in the second panel
in Table 3. While the effect on the elevation of the weighting function appears to be
somewhat weaker quantitatively, it remains statistically highly significant.10
We next look at the regression results using log utility, shown in the lower panel
of Table 3. We now do not find any significant effect of stakes on the probability
weighting function. Figure 3b shows graphically how the weighting function for high
stakes remains as elevated as the one for low stakes. This is due to the better fit of
the utility function, which is capable of accommodating the two-fold pattern of risk
preferences over outcomes we found. The log utility function used thus absorbs all
the stake variations over outcomes in our data.
10We do not show any regression results using the two-parameter expo-power function for space reasons.
Using such a function, we do, however, still find a significant violation of separability. This confirms the
conclusion of Fehr-Duda et al. (2010) that the phenomenon carries over to such functions.
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Fig. 3 Probability weighting function for low and high stakes
3.4 Discussion of experiment 1
The data obtained for gains in experiment 1 show a double two-fold pattern of risk
preferences. First, they show risk seeking for small stakes and risk aversion for large
stakes at intermediate probabilities, as well as a general increase of relative risk aver-
sion with stakes. Second, we found that relative risk aversion systematically increases
in probabilities, thus replicating typical patterns of risk seeking for small proba-
bilities and risk aversion for large probabilities at different stake levels. Modeling
approaches relying on a single subjective dimension, such as Markowitz-expected
utility and Dual-expected utility, were clearly shown to be rejected in the nonpara-
metric analysis. Nonetheless, Dual-EU showed a clearly better fit, showing that for
this type of stake range variations over probabilities are significantly more important
than variations over outcomes.
Proceeding to parametrically fitting the data, a single parameter logarithmic func-
tion provided the best fit to our data. This extends a recent insight by Scholten and
Read (2014) to moderate and large probability levels. This insight also goes beyond
a mere fitting exercise, and tells us something substantive about how our subjects
perceived the experimental stimuli. Indeed, the pattern of increasing relative risk
aversion found cannot possibly be fitted using a power utility function, which encom-
passes constant relative risk aversion. Relative to the exponential function, the data
are found to exhibit decreasing absolute risk aversion, which the latter cannot accom-
modate. This provides an indication that the observation of monetary stimuli indeed
seems to follow something akin to the patterns postulated in the Weber-Fechner
law—the subjective perception of a stimulus is proportional to the log of the stimu-
lus itself. Using the logarithmic utility function in conjunction with a two-parameter
weighting function furthermore made the effect of stake size on probability weighting
disappear.
In contrast to Scholten and Read (2014), we used a two-parameter probability
weighting function. In our setting such a function was indeed found to be essential,
given the low levels of risk aversion we found, and the observation of the twofold
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pattern over outcomes for p = 0.5. Such high levels of risk taking may not be excep-
tional. L’Haridon and Vieider (2016) examined prospect theory functionals across
30 countries with students, and found quite elevated weighting functions to be the
norm in developing and middle income countries. Vieider et al. (2013) and Vieider
et al. (2016a) found these patters to extend to rural populations in developing coun-
tries. This may indeed also explain the more elevated weighting function found by
Fehr-Duda et al. (2010) in their Chinese data.
The general elevation of the function may be dependent on the general level of risk
aversion observed, and hence on the probabilities for which the two-fold pattern over
outcomes is observed. In our case and given our stimuli, we observed this pattern
most strongly for p = 0.5. This requires an elevated weighting function to a point
wherew(0.5) > 0.5, so as to guarantee thatw(0.5)v(2x) > v(x) for low stake levels,
as described by Scholten and Read (2014). Prospect theory can easily accommodate
such an elevated weighting function under its modern form. While for instance the
original formulation of prospect theory required subcertainty to explain violations
such as the Allais paradox (see Kahneman and Tversky 1979, p. 281-282), under
the modern version incorporating rank-dependance (Tversky and Kahneman 1992),
this principle is replaced by a considerably milder condition that does not rely on
w(0.5) < 0.5.11
4 Experiment 2: Hypothetical gains and losses
4.1 Motivation
The results in experiment 1 present a clear verdict in favor of log utility. Nonetheless,
that experiment suffered from some limitations. Most importantly perhaps, using
incentivized tasks limited us to the examination of gains only, thus really only con-
sidering a ‘two-fold pattern’ over outcomes for gains. The stake variation we could
use was also limited due to the incentives used, which resulted in not being able to
replicate Markowitz’s thought experiment for small probabilities. We thus designed
experiment 2 to complement experiment 1 on these issues. In particular, using hypo-
thetical tasks will allow us to investigate losses as well as gains, and to use wider
stake ranges.
4.2 Experimental setup
Participants and setting We recruited 51 students from a standing subject pool at
the University of Reading. Most participants were new to experiments and studied
11Following the example used by Kahneman and Tversky (1979), assume we observe the preferences
2400  (0.33, 2500; 0.66, 2400; 0) and (2400, 0.34; 0) ≺ (2500, 0.33; 0). Subcertainty would have
required w(0.34) + w(0.66) < 1. Under PT in its modern formulation, this is replaced by the condi-
tion w(0.34) + [w(0.99) − w(0.66)] < 1. This condition is much milder, and generally compatible with
w(0.5) > 0.5. It can also easily be calculated that this condition is fulfilled by the weighting function
estimated using our data.
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economics or business. The general conditions were made to be as similar as possi-
ble to experiment 1. The experiment was again run using paper and pencil, and the
instructions followed those for experiment 1 closely. The one major difference was
that choices were hypothetical, and subjects were paid a fixed fee of £15 for their
participation. The experiment lasted about 1 hour.
Stimuli The stimuli are shown in Table 4. The outcomes range from £200—the high-
est outcome in experiment 1—to £100,000. Paralleling the design for experiment 1,
all stake levels are present for all probabilities, and we added prospects with non-
zero lower outcomes to be able to econometrically separate utility curvature from
probability weighting. The stakes for gains are exactly replicated for losses. We did
not include any mixed prospects, so that the loss aversion parameter λ cannot be
identified.
4.3 Nonparametric analysis of results
We start from a nonparametric analysis of the data. Out of our 51 subjects, 10 (or
19.6%) switched multiple times between the sure outcome and the prospect at least
in some cases. This rate is quite high for certainty equivalents, and significantly
higher than in experiment 1 (p < 0.001, binomial test). Increased levels of noise are
quite typical when using hypothetical stakes (Smith and Walker 1993), and Vieider
(2017) specifically observed increased levels of multiple switching under hypothet-
ical as compared to real payoff conditions. There is also a possibility, however, that
the difference may at least in part be due to differences in subject pools. Consistent
with experiment 1, we eliminate multiple switchers from the data, leaving us with 41
subjects.
Figure 4 shows the relative risk premia for gains. Compared to experiment 1, we
find higher levels of risk taking for the stake level of £200, which was included in
both experiments. This is particularly evident for the 50-50 prospect over that stake
level, for which we cannot reject risk neutrality in experiment 2, while we found clear
risk aversion in experiment 1. Other than that, however, the qualitative pattern looks
very similar to the one found in experiment 1. For a given probability level, we can
see risk aversion to increase steadily in stakes. For p = 0.1, we find risk seeking
for lower stake levels, which turns into risk neutrality for the largest stakes. This
pattern is consistent with Markowitz’s thought experiment, although for the stakes
used we do not yet observe fully fledged risk aversion for the smallest probability.
For p = 0.9 we find risk aversion throughout. For p = 0.5, the initial risk neutrality
turns into risk aversion as the stakes increase. However, the increase over stakes is
also less regular than seen in experiment 1. This is largely due to outliers and the
relatively high levels of noise in the data. There is also a clear pattern of risk aversion
increasing in the probability of winning for all stake levels.
Figure 5 shows the corresponding risk premia for losses, where a positive value
now indicates risk seeking. Across probabilities, we find a pattern that is the mirror
image of the one observed for gains. For the smallest probability of p = 0.1, we find
risk aversion to be the prevalent pattern throughout. For p = 0.9, we find risk seek-
ing across the outcome spectrum. For the intermediate probability of p = 0.5, risk
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Fig. 4 Mean normalized CEs with 95% confidence intervals
neutrality cannot be rejected. This pattern is consistent with the fourfold pattern of
risk preferences over probabilities incorporated into prospect theory. When it comes
to Markowitz’s fourfold pattern over outcomes, however, we cannot replicate the pat-
terns we found for gains. In particular, there does not appear to be a clear pattern to
risk preferences as outcomes change for any of the probability levels. This finding
is in agreement with previous evidence, with most studies investigating stake effects
for losses finding no stake effects (Bouchouicha et al. 2017; Etchart-Vincent 2004;
Fehr-Duda et al. 2010; Scholten and Read 2014).12
4.4 Econometric fitting of functional forms
We now proceed to fitting functional forms to the data. We follow the same approach
as for experiment 1, except that we normalize outcomes by dividing them by the
highest outcome in the stimuli. This makes the utility coefficients easier to interpret
given the wide stake range, and does not otherwise affect our results.
Table 5 shows the estimates of the functional forms. We start by discussing the
models transforming only a single dimension subjectively—DEU and MEU. Once
again, DEU can clearly be seen to fit our data significantly better than the primal
(p < 0.001, Clarke test), thus confirming the results from experiment 1. Notice
how this result is now stronger than it was before, seeing how the outcome range is
much larger. Nonetheless, the variation of risk preferences found over outcomes is of
second order importance relative to the variation we observe over probability levels.
12An exception is constituted by Bosch-Dome`nech and Silvestre (2006), who found strong stake effects
for losses as well as for gains.
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Fig. 5 Mean normalized CEs with 95% confidence intervals
We also confirm another surprising result from experiment 1, namely that PT with
power utility fits the data no better than the DEU model assuming linear probability
(p = 0.485, likelihood-ratio test).
Among the full PT specifications, exponential utility clearly outperforms power
utility (p < 0.001, Clarke test), as does logarithmic utility (p < 0.001, Clarke
test). Among the latter two, logarithmic utility fits the data significantly better (p =
0.009, Clarke test), thus providing further support for the conclusions drawn from
experiment 1. This difference appears to derive mainly from gains, however, since for
losses utility is estimated to be linear under both exponential and logarithmic utility.
Linear utility has indeed been found frequently for losses (see Abdellaoui 2000, for
a discussion).
This leaves separability to be discussed. Table 6 shows regressions for our three
PT models, where the parameters of the probability weighting function are made to
depend on a dummy indicating high stakes (defined as a high outcome larger than
£2,000 in absolute value). At first glance, the results appear to be once again perfectly
in line with those of experiment 1. Indeed, we find separability to be clearly violated
for gains when adopting a power function for utility. Adopting an exponential util-
ity function instead, this violation appears to be somewhat reduced, and finally the
violation disappears once we adopt the logarithmic utility function.
This result is, however, not quite as stable as in experiment 1. While the results
presented for experiment 1 were indeed invariant to the cut-off point for the definition
of high stakes, this is not the case for experiment 2. In particular for the smallest
stakes of £200 and £400 we do find violations of separability. Table 7 shows the
regressions from Table 6, except that the stake dummy is now defined such as to
capture all but the two lowest stake levels. Other than in the results shown above, we
now find that probabilitistic sensitivity is lower under high stakes than it is under low
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Table 5 Parameter estimations for different models
Prospect theory Markowitz-EU Dual-EU
power expo log
ρ -0.025 1.045
[-0.332,0.282] [0.828,1.261]
θ -0.201 1.153
[-0.609,0.207] [1.011,1.295]
μ 0.710 2.311
[0.327,1.092] [1.635,2.988]
ν 0.277 1.238
[-0.002,0.557] [0.589,1.887]
γ 1.223
[0.188,2.259]
δ 0.060
[-0.004,0.124]
α gains 0.508 0.530 0.530 0.508
[0.450,0.565] [0.469,0.590] [0.469,0.590] [0.450,0.566]
β gains 1.109 0.986 0.969 1.084
[0.801,1.417] [0.862,1.110] [0.842,1.096] [0.960,1.207]
α losses 0.593 0.604 0.623 0.595
[0.528,0.659] [0.539,0.668] [0.555,0.691] [0.530,0.660]
β losses 1.165 0.942 0.953 0.979
[0.762,1.568] [0.864,1.020] [0.874,1.032] [0.897,1.061]
σ 0.203 0.200 0.200 0.228 0.203
[0.181,0.225] [0.178,0.223] [0.178,0.223] [0.204,0.252] [0.181,0.225]
Subjects 41 41 41 41 41
log-likelihood 5094.09 5107.50 5109.17 4861.00 5093.37
95% Confidence intervals in parentheses
stakes. This clearly violates one of the conditions necessary for separability to hold,
and indeed we also find the elevation parameter β to be affected by stake size, with
more probabilistic pessimism for gains for higher stakes. This effect still appears to
be strongest for power utility and weakest for log utility, but there remains a clear
violation in the last case, and the differences between the utility functions are now
quantitative rather than qualitative.
4.5 Discussion of experiment 2
Compared to experiment 1, experiment 2 fielded much larger (hypothetical) stake
sizes, and losses in addition to gains. For gains, we found very similar patterns
to those observed in experiment 1. Fitting functional forms to the data, we once
again found a logarithmic utility function combined with a two-parameter probability
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Table 6 Stake effects on probability weighting, power utility
Power utility
Parameters: ρ θ α+ β+ α− β− σ
constant 0.257** -0.063 0.540*** 0.709*** 0.603*** 0.986*** 0.193***
(0.107) (0.168) (0.032) (0.106) (0.035) (0.164) (0.015)
high stakes -0.043 0.191*** -0.013 0.083* 0.011
(0.037) (0.047) (0.036) (0.044) (0.011)
Expo utility
Parameters: μ ν α+ β+ α− β− σ
constant 0.284 0.104 0.540*** 0.954*** 0.603*** 0.927*** 0.193***
(0.215) (0.164) (0.032) (0.065) (0.035) (0.043) (0.015)
high stakes -0.035 0.147** -0.007 0.061 0.011
(0.035) (0.071) (0.035) (0.053) (0.011)
Log utility
Parameters: γ δ α+ β+ α− β− σ
constant 0.426 0.051 0.540*** 0.954*** 0.603*** 0.927*** 0.193***
(0.413) (0.033) (0.032) (0.065) (0.035) (0.044) (0.015)
high stakes -0.033 0.129 0.026 0.049 0.011
(0.035) (0.081) (0.035) (0.045) (0.011)
∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01;
weighting function to fit the data best. The results thus broadly confirm the insights
obtained from experiment 1. For losses, we observed systematic variations over prob-
abilities, but not over stakes. This is in line with most of the literature investigating
stake effects for losses. Together, these findings confirm the existence of a fourfold
pattern of risk preferences over probabilities. Over outcomes, we confirm the exis-
tence of a two-fold pattern over gains, but we are unable to reproduce the whole
fourfold patterns over gains and losses as postulated by Markowitz. This may well
be due at least in part to the unfamiliarity of decisions over large losses in our sub-
ject pool. It may be difficult to contemplate losses over amounts that a respondent is
unlikely to have.
Our conclusions about separability are more nuanced. We observe separability
violations over the whole outcome range when using either power or exponential
utility. These violations are eliminated when adopting a logarithmic utility function.
However, other than in experiment 1, this is only the case for some stake levels, while
we still observe violations when allowing the weighting function to differ between
the lowest two stake levels and the higher ones. Interestingly, this violation seems to
be driven by a tilt in the weighting function for higher outcomes—an effect that was
also observed by Fehr-Duda et al. (2010). In particular, high stake levels appear to
reduce probabilistic sensitivity. This insight is consistent with studies finding such a
rotation of the weighting function when stimuli are affect-rich or salient (Hsee and
Rottenstreich 2004; Rottenstreich and Hsee 2001; Vieider et al. 2016b).
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Table 7 Stake effects on probability weighting, power utility
Power utility
Parameters: ρ θ α+ β+ α− β− σ
Constant 0.203* -0.114 0.580*** 0.715*** 0.585*** 1.025*** 0.193***
(0.111) (0.187) (0.037) (0.103) (0.040) (0.186) (0.016)
high stakes 2 -0.087** 0.223*** 0.012 0.080 0.008
(0.037) (0.052) (0.037) (0.057) (0.012)
Expo utility
Parameters: μ ν α+ β+ α− β− σ
Constant 0.290 0.217 0.580*** 0.898*** 0.585*** 0.920*** 0.193***
(0.181) (0.136) (0.037) (0.065) (0.040) (0.049) (0.016)
high stakes 2 -0.079** 0.197*** 0.022 0.040 0.008
(0.037) (0.058) (0.035) (0.053) (0.012)
Log utility
Parameters: γ δ α+ β+ α− β− σ
Constant 0.383 0.062** 0.580*** 0.898*** 0.585*** 0.920*** 0.193***
(0.286) (0.031) (0.037) (0.065) (0.040) (0.049) (0.016)
high stakes 2 -0.078** 0.189*** 0.054 0.043 0.008
(0.037) (0.058) (0.033) (0.051) (0.012)
∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01;
5 Conclusion
Risk attitudes have been found to vary significantly with the characteristics of the
decision problem. Historically, Markowitz (1952) proposed to model such variations
using a reference-dependent utility function defined over changes in wealth, while
treating probabilities linearly. Psychologists, on the other hand, proposed early on to
model risk preferences using subjective transformations of probabilities into decision
weights, while treating outcomes linearly (Preston and Baratta 1948). While prospect
theory combined these two different traditions into one unified framework (Kahne-
man and Tversky 1979; Tversky and Kahneman 1992), Markowitz’s fourfold pattern
over outcomes has generally been neglected in this setup (Scholten and Read 2014).
Indeed, power utility—the most popular utility function used in the prospect the-
ory literature (Wakker 2008)—cannot accommodate changes in relative risk aversion
over outcomes while keeping probabilities constant.
In two experiments, we revisited the issue of relative risk aversion changing over
outcomes, and to what extent such changes can be accommodated using a prospect
theory framework. We found clear changes in risk preferences for gains as stakes
increased, including qualitative changes from risk seeking to risk aversion. We did
not find any changes in relative risk aversion over stakes for losses. Fitting functional
forms to this pattern, we found probability transformations to provide a better fit than
outcome transformations. This result held even when (hypothetical) stakes ranged
up to £100,000, and provides an indication that variations in risk preferences over
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probabilities are generally more important than variations over outcomes. The best-
fitting function, however, was a prospect theory function combining a two-parameter
weighting function with a logarithmic utility function as proposed by Scholten and
Read (2014). The latter combined increasing relative risk aversion with decreasing
absolute risk aversion—an empirically desirable quality (Wakker 2010).
We further revisited violations of prospect theory deriving from the observation
that variations over stakes may result in changes in probability weighting (Fehr-Duda
et al. 2010). Our conclusions in this respect are mixed. Logarithmic utility could
indeed absorb such violations in some cases, showing how a good functional fit to
the data is essential. In at least one case, however, logarithmic utility could not fully
eliminate this violation. This was found to be due to differing reactions to stake
variations dependent on the level of probability, which resulted in a change in prob-
abilistic sensitivity as well as probabilistic pessimism. This indeed seems to be an
essential element in separability violations, which appears to be driven by an increase
in probabilistic insensitivity when outcomes are affect-rich or salient.
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